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※ 引述《zxcvforz (塔歐茲)》之銘言：
: ※ 引述《marking (發泡蘇打粉)》之銘言：

Taipei, Taiwan — After months of simmering tensions between Taiwan’s ruling
Kuomintang (KMT) and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) backed
by members of civil society, the debate over the Cross-Strait Services Trade
Agreement (CSSTA) has finally reached a breaking point. During the past week,
demonstrators – whom media outlets continue to misleadingly refer to only as
“students” – successfully occupied the Legislative Yuan and Executive
Yuan, managing to hold off police attempts to evict them from the former for
almost a week. Yet amidst the commotion and calls to either renegotiate the
agreement article by article or disband it in its entirety, three key issues
have fallen by the wayside: the legality and implications of reneging on a
bilateral agreement, the significance of international image and reputation
for diplomatic relations, and most importantly, how to design feasible and
effective ways to protect the most vulnerable members of Taiwanese society.

連月來執政的國民黨與獲公民社會支持的在野民進黨之間情勢逐漸上升
兩岸服貿協議的爭議終於來到臨界點
最近這一週，被媒體統稱為「學生」的示威群眾成功攻佔了立法院及行政院
在警力驅趕下成功據守立法院將近一週之久。
然而在動亂和「重新逐條審查或完全撤回服貿」的呼聲之中
三大關鍵議題卻遭到忽略；
那就是重新協商雙邊協議的合法性與意義、國際外交形象與聲譽的重要性
以及最重要的，如何規劃可行又有效的方式來保護台灣社會最弱勢的族群。

When the KMT concluded negotiations with the mainland and signed the CSSTA
last July, it marked the beginning of a series of orthodox democratic
attempts to force the ruling party to take into consideration theconcerns of
opposition lawmakers, labor groups, and civil society. Lobbying, public
hearings, and tame demonstrations, all standard fare in today’s
representative democracies, had limited impact. Brawling between politicians
in the legislature, a local tradition, was equally ineffective. In effect,
the domesticated backlash has thus far allowed the government to appear
democratic while simultaneously pushing a run-of-the-mill neoliberal agenda
supported by conservative lawmakers, the mainland Chinese government, and
powerful business interests on both sides of the strait. The move by the
ruling party to sign the agreement without prior consultation was admittedly
undemocratic – even by the weakest standards of what constitutes democratic
policymaking behavior. Nevertheless, it was successful, and therein lies the
crucial issue whose implications must be now be reckoned with.

2013年7月國民黨與中國已完成協商，並簽署服貿協議
以迫使執政黨將在野黨議員、勞工團體及公民社會的疑慮列入考量為宗旨的
一系列正統民主運動也於焉展開。
現今代議民主下的標準程序如遊說、公聽會及溫和的示威活動等
影響力都非常有限，立法院的兩黨口水戰也一樣沒路用
事實上到目前為止，溫和的反對聲浪讓政府表面上仍能保持民主
但又同時散播由保守派議員、中國政府
及在海峽兩岸都有利益關係的影響力企業所擁護的新自由主義陳腔濫調。
即使以最低的標準來看，
執政黨在未經內部協商的情況下簽署條款也已違反民主精神
然而這種作法成功了，也因此現在必須去檢視這些關鍵議題帶來的影響

For months, demands for an article-by-article review of the agreement have
been the central focus of opponents’ strategic roadmap. In theory, such a
review would have major benefits in that the impacts of each article for
specific sectors of society and the economy could be analyzed and the
democratic process would be utilized. In practice, however, it is not a
feasible option for three reasons.
 First, the agreement would remain indefinitely vulnerable to political
impasse. Protracted negotiations would increase the potential for ultimate
failure as well as the opportunity cost for legislators who have remained
predominantly focused on promoting or opposing the agreement instead of on
alternative political engagements. Second, renewed renegotiations with the
mainland would be required.
Proponents have long suggested that article-by-article discussion would
legally force a return to negotiation with the mainland over the agreement,
and only recently have opponents finally begun to come to terms with this
reality. This realization should have come long ago. Had the agreement’s
detractors accepted this earlier on, their energy could have been focused on
more realistic and creative approaches to confronting the issue. Third,
failure to implement the agreement may invite a confrontational reaction from
Beijing and, perhaps needless to say, will not result in any further
concessions in Taiwan’s favor. As with any bilateral agreement, it is the
expectation of both parties that signing will be followed by political and
logistical implementation. Not fulfilling this expectation will be seen as
either ineptness or resistance on the part of the Taiwan government, which
may provoke confrontation with the mainland. As historical evidence can
attest, such a situation does not bode well for the future of cross-strait
and regional relations. In short, the threadbare article-by-article
renegotiation model forwarded by opponents is fruitless and poorly conceived,
as it implies a return to negotiations with Beijing that are unlikely to be
advantageous for any members of Taiwanese society.

數月以來，反對派的策略核心一直是要求逐條審查
理論上逐條審查應該會有很大的好處
可以好好分析每一項條文對各個社會及經濟領域的影響，實踐民主程序。
但事實上這種做法並不可行，原因有三點：
首先，協議永遠會受到政治僵局影響
延長談判將推升最終失敗的風險以及機會成本
因為立法委員依然只專注於支持或反對服貿，而不會另尋其他政策對策。
其次，這也需要與中國重新進行談判。
支持服貿派一直主張，逐條審查會合法地迫使中國重回談判桌，
但直到最近反對派才終於開始意識到真正的現實狀況，
如果反對陣營早一點認清這個事實，
就能專注於找出更實際、更創新的辦法來解決此一問題。
第三，若未能履行服貿，可能會引發北京方面的反擊
無需贅言，結果不可能會是對台灣讓步。
就和其他雙邊協議一樣，雙方都期望簽署服貿後
後續在政治及實務上也能順利落實，
若不能實現這些期望，將被視為是台灣政府的失能或從中作梗所致
可能因此引發中國方面的不滿。
歷史的教訓告訴我們，這種情況對兩岸的未來及區域關係來說都不是什麼吉兆。
簡而言之，反對派提出的逐條審議再協商模式是沒有用的，而且評價不高
因為這代表要與中國重新進行協商
這不可能為台灣社會的任何族群帶來好處。

Yet the deleterious effects of failure to implement the CSSTA would not only
be domestic or bilateral; the international implications would be equally
grave. Taiwanese history over the past decades has represented an arduous
struggle for diplomatic recognition. Indeed, it is the foundation upon which
almost all of the island’s foreign policy depends. Reneging on a bilateral
agreement, such as the CSSTA, would serve as a clear indication to the
international community that the local government lacks the capacity to
effectively engage in international relations. The logic runs like this: If
Taipei cannot succeed in fulfilling an already signed trade agreement with
its closest neighbor and most significant trading partner, the risks involved
for other countries in deepening economic ties with Taiwan may outweigh the
potential benefits. For better or worse, international image and reputation
are key to diplomatic relations. Should Taiwanese lawmakers fail to push
through the agreement at this late a stage in negotiations, they are shooting
themselves in the foot.

不過未能落實服貿的負面影響不只是限於國內或兩岸，在國際之間也一樣
過去幾十年來，台灣的歷史是一場爭取外交承認的苦戰
的確，台灣的外交政策幾乎全以此為基礎
像服貿這樣的雙邊協議，若中途退出
國際社會將會認為是台灣政府在國際關係方面失能
原理是這樣的
如果台灣無法成功履行已經和最大貿易夥伴－中國簽署的貿易協定
其他國家和台灣深化經濟關係的風險可能會高於潛在利益
無論如何，國際形象及聲譽是外交關係的關鍵
在談判末期，台灣立法委員卻未能通過服貿，等於是搬石頭砸自己的腳

Yet the most potent criticism of the CSSTA is not that its proponents
neglected to use the democratic process in its signing but the fact that the
agreement may well have serious negative impacts on certain members and
sectors of Taiwanese society. Given that the explicitly stated purpose of the
agreement is to open the gates to cross-strait investment, opponents envision
a flood of Chinese businesses entering the Taiwanese market and competing
with Taiwanese local businesses. The fear of an economically powerful
neighbor is a rational one. Latin American countries, for example, have long
had to cope with the challenges of living under the shadow of U.S. economic
and political influence. Though the analogy may seem far-fetched, the ongoing
impasse in cross-strait relations is not altogether different.

服貿爭議中最值得批評之處，不是支持者在簽署過程沒有透過民主程序
而是服貿可能會對台灣社會的某些族群及產業造成嚴重的負面衝擊
服貿開宗明義是要開啟兩岸投資之門
反對派認為，大陸企業將會群起湧入台灣市場，和台灣本土企業相互競爭
會擔心經濟上較強大的中國是很合理的
例如拉丁美洲國家，長久以來都必須面對活在美國經濟與政治影響陰影下的挑戰
雖然這個比喻有點誇張，但和兩岸關係陷入僵局的狀況倒也相去不遠

Today, in Taiwan, the fear and uncertainty over the CSSTA is palpable. None
can predict with accuracy how exactly it will affect local industries. The
most critical issue is ensuring that the most vulnerable sectors of the
economy and members of society are not negatively impacted by the CSSTA. The
first step is to accept the reality that the agreement has already been
signed into law and may be pushed through the Legislative Yuan or handed off
to the Executive Yuan for final approval. The second and most vital step will
then be to design and implement a system of safeguard mechanisms to guarantee
that select sectors and groups will be sheltered from the hypothetical storm
of Chinese investment.

如今在台灣，對服貿的憂懼和不確定顯而易見
沒有人能精準預測服貿究竟會對本土產業帶來什麼樣的影響
最重要的是確保台灣社會最弱勢的族群和經濟產業不會因服貿受到負面衝擊
而第一步就是要接受服貿已經簽署為法條的現實
交由立法院或行政院完成最後批准
第二步也是最重要的一步，那就是規劃並落實一套安全機制
保護相關產業及團體，不受中資風暴的影響

There is good news and bad news. The good news is that implementing such
safeguards is a real possibility both legally and logistically. Forward
progress on the issue will rest heavily on Article 8 of the agreement, which
stipulates that both parties can call for negotiations in the event of a
service industry sector or population being negatively impacted. Blueprints
for these safeguard mechanisms should take advantage of the wealth of issue-
and industry-specific domestic and international expertise that is available
to assess the policy impacts of the bilateral free trade agreement. The plans
should provide quantifiable limits on acceptable CSSTA-inflicted impacts,
clear guidelines on measurement of these impacts, and details on how the
government will respond when impacts exceed stated limits. Moreover, they
should also outline a plan for periodic reassessment of the safeguard
mechanisms to ensure that they can adapt to changing economic and political
trends. The other good news is that guaranteeing the continued wellbeing of
Taiwanese society is an issue that can be agreed upon. At least in principle,
KMT and DPP lawmakers, business and labor groups, and activists of all
stripes express interest in the island’s economic and social development,
and many are committed to investing significant time and effort into the
issue.

這有好也有壞，好消息是，落實這樣的安全機制在法律上和理論上都確實可行
建立安全機制必須高度仰賴服貿中第八條的緊急磋商機制
(中略)
另外一個好消息是，確保台灣社會的福祉這一點是可以達成共識的
至少在原則上，國民黨和民進黨議員、企業、勞工團體及各派民運人士
都很重視台灣經濟及社會發展，許多人也願意為此投入大量的時間和心力

The bad news is that it will require a concerted effort amongst these diverse
interests. Whether or not the capacity to do so in contemporary two-party
democracies has all but vanished is difficult to say. Given that it is in the
best interest of all parties involved to overcome this obstacle, the
possibility is there, and now is the time to take advantage of it. How the
debacle will play out in the coming days and weeks is anybody’s guess. Yet
the realization that there are opportunities for basic agreement on the
creation of safeguard mechanisms may bring some focus and rationality to the
seemingly intractable dispute. This should come as a breath of relief for all
those so deeply invested in its outcome.

壞消息是這還是需要各方放下利益衝突，齊力合作才行
解決此一障礙合乎各方的利益，還是有合作的機會，而現在正是理想的時機
未來這幾天或這幾週，風波會如何收場，大家都在猜測
但認清現在有機會建立安全機制，或許能在爭議中凝聚焦點和動力
那些大力押注在服貿上的人應該可以鬆口氣了




: 我有一個問題：
: 單純以台灣的法律來看，服貿在去年六月簽署的這個「簽署」動作，
: 有台灣政府的完全授權嗎？
: 如果有，那麼就是說台灣對大陸的所有協議，都不需經過國會審查？
: 如果沒有，是不是代表這個「簽署」動作本來就是違法？
: 就目前看馬政府的主張，是台灣與大陸一切協議都可以不經過國會審查。
: 請問相關規定確實是如此嗎？

  我也想請問，這個作者主張的國際信用，真的有那麼大的影響嗎?
  服貿至今真的已經沒有回頭路了嗎?
  有沒有外交國關方面的專家能來釋疑?感謝!




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