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The New York Times

紐約時報

And Then Steve Said, ‘Let There Be an iPhone’

Jobs 說：要有iPhone，於是世界變了！  -  寫在賈伯斯逝世兩周年


The 55 miles from Campbell to San Francisco make for one of the nicest
commutes anywhere. The journey mostly zips along the Junipero Serra
Freeway, a grand and remarkably empty highway that abuts the east side
of the Santa Cruz Mountains. It is one of the best places in Silicon
Valley to spot a start-up tycoon speed-testing his Ferrari and one of
the worst places for cellphone reception. For Andy Grignon, it was
therefore the perfect place for him to be alone with his thoughts
early on Jan. 8, 2007.



This wasn’t Grignon’s typical route to work. He was a senior engineer
at Apple in Cupertino, the town just west of Campbell. His morning drive
typically covered seven miles and took exactly 15 minutes. But today
was different. He was going to watch his boss, Steve Jobs, make history
at the Macworld trade show in San Francisco. Apple fans had for years
begged Jobs to put a cellphone inside their iPods so they could stop
carrying two devices in their pockets. Jobs was about to fulfill that
wish. Grignon and some colleagues would spend the night at a nearby
hotel, and around 10 a.m. the following day they — along with the rest
of the world — would watch Jobs unveil the first iPhone.




的酒店過夜，然後在第二天早晨 10 點左右的樣子，和世界上所有人一起，

見證賈伯斯發表他的第一款 iPhone。

But as Grignon drove north, he didn’t feel excited. He felt terrified.
Most onstage product demonstrations in Silicon Valley are canned. The
thinking goes, why let bad Internet or cellphone connections ruin an
otherwise good presentation? But Jobs insisted on live presentations.
It was one of the things that made them so captivating. Part of his
legend was that noticeable product-demo glitches almost never happened.
But for those in the background, like Grignon, few parts of the job
caused more stress.

可是，當 Grignon 一路驅車向北時，他感受到的情緒並非激動，並非欣喜，



挑出任何微小的瑕疵，賈伯斯就是如此成功。只是人們不知道，像 Grignon

這樣的幕後工作人員，承受了多少心理壓力。

Grignon was the senior manager in charge of all the radios in the iPhone.
This is a big job. Cellphones do innumerable useful things for us today,
but at their most basic, they are fancy two-way radios. Grignon was in
charge of the equipment that allowed the phone to be a phone. If the
device didn’t make calls, or didn’t connect with Bluetooth headsets
or Wi-Fi setups, Grignon had to answer for it. As one of the iPhone’s
earliest engineers, he’d dedicated two and a half years of his life —
oftenseven days a week — to the project.


得能收聽電話，而電話也就只是一個可以雙向通信的無線電設備罷了。Grignon



Grignon had been part of the iPhone rehearsal team at Apple and later
at the presentation site in San Francisco’s Moscone Center. He had
rarely seen Jobs make it all the way through his 90-minute show without
a glitch. Jobs had been practicing for five days, yet even on the last
day of rehearsals the iPhone was still randomly dropping calls, losing
its Internet connection, freezing or simply shutting down.



“At first it was just really cool to be at rehearsals at all — kind
of like a cred badge,” Grignon says. Only a chosen few were allowed
to attend. “But it quickly got really uncomfortable. Very rarely did
I see him become completely unglued — it happened, but mostly he just
looked at you and very directly said in a very loud and stern voice,
‘You are [expletive] up my company,’ or, ‘If we fail, it will be
because of you.’ He was just very intense. And you would always feel
an inch tall.”Grignon, like everyone else at rehearsals, knew that if
those glitches showed up during the real presentation, Jobs would not
be blaming himself for the problems. “It felt like we’d gone through
the demo a hundred times, and each time something went wrong,” Grignon
says. “It wasn’t a good feeling.”



演了 demo 幾百遍，可每一遍總有狀況發生，感覺很差。」Grignon 說道。


The preparations were top-secret. From Thursday through the end of the
following week, Apple completely took over Moscone. Backstage, it built
an eight-by-eight-foot electronics lab to house and test the iPhones.
Next to that it built a greenroom with a sofa for Jobs. Then it posted
more than a dozen security guards 24 hours a day in front of those rooms
and at doors throughout the building. No one got in without having his or
her ID electronically checked and compared with a master list that Jobs
had personally approved. The auditorium where Jobs was rehearsing was
off limits to all but a small group of executives. Jobs was so obsessed
with leaks that he tried to have all the contractors Apple hired — from
people manning booths and doing demos to those responsible for lighting
and sound — sleep in the building the night before his presentation.
Aides talked him out of it.


乎每一扇門前都安置了保全人員，24 小時看護著門裡的機密不被洩露。如



Grignon knew the iPhone unveiling was not an ordinary product announcement,
but no one could have anticipated what a seminal moment it would become.
In the span of seven years, the iPhone and its iPad progeny have become
among the most important innovations in Silicon Valley’s history. They
transformed the stodgy cellphone industry. They provided a platform for
a new and hugely profitable software industry — mobile apps, which have
generated more than $10 billion in revenue since they began selling in
2008. And they have upended the multibillion-dollar personal-computer
industry. If you include iPad sales with those for desktops and laptops,
Apple is now the largest P.C. maker in the world. Around 200 million
iPhones and iPads were sold last year, or more than twice the number
of cars sold worldwide.


年一年 iPhone 和 iPad的出貨量是兩億台，是全球汽車出售量的兩倍還多。


The impact has been not only economic but also cultural. Apple’s
innovations have set off an entire rethinking of how humans interact
with machines. It’s not simply that we use our fingers now instead
of a mouse. Smartphones, in particular, have become extensions of our
brains. They have fundamentally changed the way people receive and
process information. Ponder the individual impacts of the book, the
newspaper, the telephone, the radio, the tape recorder, the camera,
the video camera, the compass,the television, the VCR and the DVD, the
personal computer, the cellphone, the video game and the iPod. The
smartphone is all those things, and it fits in your pocket. Its
technology is changing the way we learn in school, the way doctors
treat patients, the way we travel and explore. Entertainment and
media are accessed and experienced in entirely new ways.



And yet Apple today is under siege. From the moment in late 2007 that
Google unveiled Android — and its own plan to dominate the world of
mobile phones and other mobile devices — Google hasn’t just tried to
compete with the iPhone; it has succeeded in competing with the iPhone.
Android has exploded in popularity since it took hold in 2010. Its share
of the global smartphone market is approaching 80 percent, while Apple’s
has fallen below 20 percent. A similar trend is under way with iPads:
in 2010 the iPad had about 90 percent of the tablet market; now more
than 60 percent of the tablets sold run Android.


的占有率，而現在，60% 的市場占有率屬於 Android。

What worries Apple fans most of all is not knowing where the company is
headed. When Jobs died in October 2011, the prevailing question wasn’t
whether Tim Cook could succeed him, but whether anyone could. When Jobs
ran Apple, the company was an innovation machine, churning out
revolutionary products every three to five years. He told his biographer,
Walter Isaacson, that he had another breakthrough coming — a revolution
in TV. But under Cook, nothing has materialized, and the lack of confidence
among investors is palpable. Apple product announcements used to routinely
send its stock soaring. When Cook presented the latest smartphones in
September, the iPhone 5c and the iPhone 5s, Apple’s stock fell 10 percent.
A year ago the company’s stock price was at $702 a share, making Apple the
world’s most valuable corporation. Today, it’s down more than 25 percent
from that peak.

最讓Apple的粉絲們著急的，不是這家公司無法給出未來將走向何方


以往，每一次Apple產品發表會都能讓Apple的股票漲勢衝天，但是
iPhone 5c 和 5s 發表會之後，Apple股價滑落了十個百分點。一年前，
Apple股價在最高峰時期能到每股 702 美元，使之成為全球最有價值
的公司。可是如今，股值已經從頂峰滑落 25%。

Comparing anyone with Steve Jobs is unfair. And during his two years as
Apple’s chief executive, Cook has taken pains to point out that Jobs
himself made it clear to him that he didn’t want Cook running Apple
the way he thought Jobs would want to, but the way Cook thought it should
be done. It hardly needed to be said. When you look back at how the
iPhone came to be, it’s clear that it had everything to do with the
unreasonable demands — and unusual power — of an inimitable man.


無需言說，當你知道 iPhone 是如何成為 iPhone 後，你就會明白，

它創造了甚至不存在的用戶需求，這樣的創造者是無法被效仿的。

It’s hard to overstate the gamble Jobs took when he decided to unveil
the iPhone back in January 2007. Not only was he introducing a new kind
of phone — something Apple had never made before — he was doing so
with a prototype that barely worked. Even though the iPhone wouldn’t
go on sale for another six months, he wanted the world to want one right
then. In truth, the list of things that still needed to be done was
enormous. A production line had yet to be set up. Only about a hundred
iPhones even existed, all of them of varying quality. Some had noticeable
gaps between the screen and the plastic edge; others had scuff marks on
the screen. And the software that ran the phone was full of bugs.



The iPhone could play a section of a song or a video, but it couldn’t
play an entire clip reliably without crashing. It worked fine if you
sent an e-mail and then surfed the Web. If you did those things in
reverse, however, it might not. Hours of trial and error had helped the
iPhone team develop what engineers called “the golden path,” a specific
set of tasks, performed in a specific way and order, that made the phone
look as if it worked.

它可以播放一部分的音樂或者影片，卻無法不停頓地順暢播放全部。
你可以很順利地用它來發送一封郵件，然後上網瀏覽其它資訊，但
你一旦將兩者順序顛倒一下，機器就可能徹底罷工。

But even when Jobs stayed on the golden path, all manner of last-minute
workarounds were required to make the iPhone functional. On announcement
day, the software that ran Grignon’s radios still had bugs. So, too,
did the software that managed the iPhone’s memory. And no one knew whether
the extra electronics Jobs demanded the demo phones include would make
these problems worse.



Jobs wanted the demo phones he would use onstage to have their screens
mirrored on the big screen behind him. To show a gadget on a big screen,
most companies just point a video camera at it, but that was unacceptable
to Jobs. The audience would see his finger on the iPhone screen, which
would mar the look of his presentation. So he had Apple engineers spend
weeks fitting extra circuit boards and video cables onto the backs of
the iPhones he would have onstage. The video cables were then connected
to the projector, so that when Jobs touched the iPhone’s calendar app
icon, for example, his finger wouldn’t appear, but the image on the big
screen would respond to his finger’s commands. The effect was magical.
People in the audience felt as if they were holding an iPhone in their
own hands. But making the setup work flawlessly, given the iPhone’s
other major problems, seemed hard to justify at the time.



The software in the iPhone’s Wi-Fi radio was so unstable that Grignon
and his team had to extend the phones’ antennas by connecting them to
wires running offstage so the wireless signal wouldn’t have to travel
as far. And audience members had to be prevented from getting on the
frequency being used. “Even if the base station’s ID was hidden” —
that is, not showing up when laptops scanned for Wi-Fi signals —
“you had 5,000 nerds in the audience,” Grignon says. “They would
have figured out how to hack into the signal.” The solution, he says,
was to tweak the AirPort software so that it seemed to be operating in
Japan instead of the United States. Japanese Wi-Fi uses some frequencies
that are not permitted in the U.S.


最後只好改掉 AirPort 軟體，讓它看起來像是在日本而不是在美
國被連接的，因為日本的 WiFi使用的頻率在美國是禁止被使用的。

There was less they could do to make sure the phone calls Jobs planned
to make from the stage went through. Grignon and his team could only
ensure a good signal, and then pray. They had AT&T, the iPhone’s wireless
carrier, bring in a portable cell tower, so they knew reception would be
strong. Then, with Jobs’s approval, they preprogrammed the phone’s
display to always show five bars of signal strength regardless of its
true strength. The chances of the radio’s crashing during the few
minutes that Jobs would use it to make a call were small, but the chances
of its crashing at some point during the 90-minute presentation were high.
“If the radio crashed and restarted, as we suspected it might, we didn’t
want people in the audience to see that,” Grignon says. “So we just
hard-coded it to always show five bars.”



None of these kludges fixed the iPhone’s biggest problem: it often ran
out of memory and had to be restarted if made to do more than a handful
of tasks at a time. Jobs had a number of demo units onstage with him to
manage this problem. If memory ran low on one, he would switch to another
while the first was restarted. But given how many demos Jobs planned,
Grignon worried that there were far too many potential points of failure.
If disaster didn’t strike during one of the dozen demos, it was sure to
happen during the grand finale, when Jobs planned to show all the iPhone’s
top features operating at the same time on the same phone. He’d play
some music, take a call, put it on hold and take another call, find and
e-mail a photo to the second caller, look up something on the Internet
for the first caller and then return to his music. “Me and my guys were
all so nervous about this,” Grignon says. “We only had 128 megabytes
of memory in those phones” — maybe the equivalent of two dozen large
digital photographs — “and because they weren’t finished, all these
apps were still big and bloated.”






Jobs rarely backed himself into corners like this. He was well known
as a taskmaster, seeming to know just how hard he could push his staff
so that it delivered the impossible. But he always had a backup, a Plan
B, that he could go to if his timetable was off.



But the iPhone was the only cool new thing Apple was working on. The
iPhone had been such an all-encompassing project at Apple that this
time there was no backup plan. “It was Apple TV or the iPhone,”
Grignon says. “And if he had gone to Macworld with just Apple TV”
— a new product that connected iTunes to a television set — “the
world would have said, ‘What the heck was that?’ ”

可是，對於Apple公司來說，iPhone 是他們所做的第一次全新的創造，


The idea that one of the biggest moments of his career might implode
made Grignon’s stomach hurt. By 2007 he’d spent virtually his entire
career at Apple or companies affiliated with it. While at the University
of Iowa in 1993, he and his friend Jeremy Wyld reprogrammed the Newton
MessagePad to wirelessly connect to the Internet. Even though the Newton
would not succeed as a product, many still regard it as the first
mainstream hand-held computer, and their hack was quite a feat back then;
it helped them both get jobs at Apple. Wyld ended up on the Newton team,
while Grignon worked in Apple’s famous R. & D. lab — the Advanced
Technology Group — on videoconferencing technology.

想到自己職業生涯當中最關鍵的一刻可能會十分慘澹地收場，Grignon



By 2000 Grignon had found his way to Pixo, a company started by a former
Apple software developer that was building operating systems for
cellphones and other small devices. When Pixo’s software ended up in
the first iPod in 2001, Grignon found himself back at Apple again.



By then, thanks to his work at Pixo, he’d become prominent for two
other areas of expertise besides videoconferencing technology: computer
radio transmitters (Wi-Fi and Bluetooth) and the workings of software
inside small hand-held devices like cellphones. Grignon moves in an
entirely different world from that inhabited by most software engineers
in the valley. Most rarely have to think about whether their code takes
up too much space on a hard drive or overloads a chip’s abilities.
Hardware on desktop and laptop computers is powerful, modifiable and
cheap; memory, hard drives and even processors can be upgraded
inexpensively; and computers are either connected to electrical outlets
or giant batteries. In Grignon’s area of embedded software, the
hardware is fixed. Code that is too big won’t run. Meanwhile, a tiny
battery — which might power a laptop for a couple of minutes — needs
enough juice to last all day. When work on the iPhone began at the end
of 2004, Grignon had a perfect set of skills to become one of the early
engineers on the project.

得益於在 Pixo 工作的經歷，Grignon 熟練掌握了兩項視訊會議
技術以外的技能：一是有關電腦基頻傳輸設備（Wi-Fi 和藍牙）的，



腦的電源還可以插入插座。但在 Grignon 所從事的內建軟體領域，



Now, in 2007, he was emotionally exhausted. He’d gained 50 pounds. He’d
put stress on his marriage. The iPhone team discovered early on that
making a phone didn’t resemble building computers or iPods at all.
“It was very dramatic,” Grignon says. “It had been drilled into
everyone’s head that this was the next big thing to come out of Apple.
So you put all these supersmart people with huge egos into very tight,
confined quarters, with that kind of pressure, and crazy stuff starts
to happen.”



Remarkably, Jobs had to be talked into having Apple build a phone at all.
It had been a topic of conversation among his inner circle almost from
the moment Apple introduced the iPod in 2001. The conceptual reasoning
was obvious: consumers would rather not carry two or three devices for
e-mail, phone calls and music if they could carry one. But every time
Jobs and his executives examined the idea in detail, it seemed like a
suicide mission. Phone chips and bandwidth were too slow for anyone to
want to surf the Internet and download music or video over a cellphone
connection. E-mail was a fine function to add to a phone, but Research
in Motion’s BlackBerry was fast locking up that market.

值得一提的是，賈伯斯也是「迫於群眾壓力」才決定要做一部手機。


Above all, Jobs didn’t want to partner with any of the wireless carriers.
Back then the carriers expected to dominate any partnership with a
phone maker, and because they controlled the network, they got their
way. Jobs, a famed control freak, couldn’t imagine doing their bidding.
Apple considered buying Motorola in 2003, but executives quickly
concluded it would be too big an acquisition for the company then.
(The two companies collaborated unsuccessfully a couple of years later.)


這個有名的控制狂是根本無法聽命於電信商的。Apple甚至還在 2003

年考慮過收購Motoromba，但很快高層們得出結論：對Apple而言，
這筆收購實在太大了。（兩三年後兩家公司也有過不成功的合作。）

But by the fall of 2004, doing business with the carriers was starting
to seem less onerous. Sprint was beginning to sell its wireless bandwidth
wholesale. This meant that by buying and reselling bandwidth from
Sprint, Apple could become its own wireless carrier — what’s known
as a “mobile virtual network operator.” Apple could build a phone
and barely have to deal with the carriers at all. Disney, on whose
board Jobs sat, was already in discussions with Sprint about just
such a deal to provide its own wireless service. Jobs was asking a lot
of questions about whether Apple should pursue one as well. The deal
Apple ultimately signed with Cingular (later acquired by AT&T) in 2006
took more than a year to hammer out, but it would prove easy compared
to what Apple went through just to build the device.


自己可以扮演電信商的角色，也就是所謂的「行動虛擬網路電信商」。


在思考Apple是否也要採用相同辦法的賈伯斯趁機問了許多問題。2006

年，在經歷一年多談判後，Apple終於和 Cingular（後被 AT&T 收購）
簽下合約。一年多的談判，聽起來不易，但與打造 iPhone 比起來，
完全是小巫見大巫。

Many executives and engineers, riding high from their success with the
iPod, assumed a phone would be like building a small Macintosh. Instead,
Apple designed and built not one but three different early versions of
the iPhone in 2005 and 2006. One person who worked on the project thinks
Apple then made six fully working prototypes of the device it ultimately
sold — each with its own set of hardware, software and design tweaks.
Some on the team ended up so burned out that they left the company shortly
after the first phone hit store shelves. “It was like the first moon
mission,” says Tony Fadell, a key executive on the project. (He started
his own company, Nest, in 2010.) “I’m used to a certain level of
unknowns in a project, but there were so many new things here that it
was just staggering.”


打造了三款 iPhone 的早期版本。參與該項目的某員工稱，Apple



Jobs wanted the iPhone to run a modified version of OS X, the software
that comes with every Mac. But no one had ever put a gigantic program
like OS X on a phone chip before. The software would have to be a tenth
its usual size. Millions of lines of code would have to be stripped out
or rewritten, and engineers would have to simulate chip speed and battery
drain because actual chips weren’t available until 2006.



No one had ever put a multitouch screen in a mainstream consumer product
before, either. Capacitive touch technology — a “touch” by either a
finger or other conductive object completes a circuit — had been around
since the 1960s. Capacitive multitouch, in which two or more fingers can
be used and independently recognized, was vastly more complicated.
Research into it began in the mid-1980s. It was well known, though,
that to build the touch-screen Apple put on the iPhone and produce it
in volume was a challenge few had the money or guts to take on. The next
steps — to embed the technology invisibly in a piece of glass, to make
it smart enough to display a virtual keyboard with autocorrect and to make
it sophisticated enough to reliably manipulate photos or Web pages on
that screen — made it hugely expensive even to produce a working
prototype. Few production lines had experience manufacturing multitouch
screens. The touch-screens in consumer electronics had typically been
pressure-sensitive ones that users pushed with a finger or a stylus.
(The PalmPilot and its successors like the Palm Treo were popular
expressions of this technology.) Even if multitouch iPhone screens had
been easy to make, it wasn’t at all clear to Apple’s executive team
that the features they enabled, like on-screen keyboards and “tap to
zoom,” were enhancements that consumers wanted.

在此前，也從未有人試過把多點觸控螢幕用在主流電子消費品上。
電容觸摸技術在 20 世紀 60 年代就出現了。而電容式多點觸控——
用戶可同時用兩個或多個手指觸摸，每個手指都可被單獨識別——
就要複雜得多。這方面的研究從 20 世紀 80 年代就開始了。不過，


As early as 2003, a handful of Apple engineers had figured out how to put
multitouch technology in a tablet. “The story was that Steve wanted a
device that he could use to read e-mail while on the toilet — that was
the extent of the product spec,” says Joshua Strickon, one of the earliest
engineers on that project. “But you couldn’t build a device with enough
battery life to take out of the house, and you couldn’t get a chip with
enough graphics capability to make it useful. We spent a lot of time
trying to figure out just what to do.” Before joining Apple in 2003,
Strickon had built a multitouch device for his master’s thesis at M.I.T.
But given the lack of consensus at Apple about what to do with the
prototypes he and his fellow engineers developed, he says, he left the
company in 2004 thinking it wasn’t going to do anything with that
technology.


麼一款設備。」iPhone 項目最早期的工程師之一 Joshua Strickon



Tim Bucher, one of Apple’s top executives at the time and the company’s
biggest multitouch proponent, says part of the problem was that the
prototypes they were building used software, OS X, that was designed
to be used with a mouse, not a finger. “We were using 10- or 12-inch
screens with Mac-mini-like guts . . . and then you would launch these
demos that would do the different multitouch gestures. One demo was a
keyboard application that would rise from the bottom — very much what
ended up shipping in the iPhone two years later. But it wasn’t very
pretty. It was very much wires, chewing gum and baling wire.”



Few even thought about making touch-screen technology the centerpiece
of a new kind of phone until Jobs started really pushing the idea in
mid-2005. “He said: ‘Tony, come over here. Here’s something we’re
working on. What do you think? Do you think we could make a phone out
of this?’ ” Fadell says, referring to a demo Jobs was playing with.
“It was huge. It filled the room. There was a projector mounted on the
ceiling, and it would project the Mac screen onto this surface that was
maybe three or four feet square. Then you could touch the Mac screen
and move things around and draw on it.” Fadell was aware of the touch-screen
prototype, but not in great detail, because it was a Mac product, and
he ran the iPod division. “So we all sat down and had a serious discussion
about it — about what could be done.”


「他說，Tony 你過來一下。我們在做這麼些東西。你怎麼看？你


Mac 螢幕上點來點去，或是在上面畫畫。」 Fadell 知道有多點觸
控原型的存在，但並不瞭解細節——它是 Mac 團隊的產品，而
Fadell 領導的是 iPod 部門。「於是，我們都坐到了一起，很嚴肅
地開會討論：有什麼是我們能做的。」

Fadell had strong doubts about shrinking such an enormous prototype so
much and then manufacturing it. But he also knew better than to say no
to Steve Jobs. He was one of Apple’s superstars, having joined the company
in 2001 as a consultant to help build the first iPod, and he didn’t get
there by being timid in the face of thorny technological problems. By 2005,
with iPod sales exploding, he had become, at 36, arguably the single most
important line executive at the company.


這可能是Apple最重要的產品線歸年僅 36 歲的 Fadell 領導。


“I understood how it could be done,” Fadell says. “But it’s one thing
to think that, and another to take a room full of special, one-off gear
and make a million phone-size versions of that in a cost-effective,
reliable manner.” The to-do list was exhausting just to think about.
“You had to go to LCD vendors who knew how to embed technology like
this in glass; you had to find time on their line; and then you had to
come up with compensation and calibrating algorithms to keep the pixel
electronics from generating all kinds of noise in the touch-screen” —
which sat on top of the LCD. “It was a whole project just to make the
touch-screen device. We tried two or three ways of actually making the
touch-screen until we could make one in enough volume that would work.”



Shrinking OS X and building a multitouch screen, while innovative and
difficult, were at least within the skills Apple had already mastered
as a corporation. No one was better equipped to rethink OS X’s design.
Apple knew LCD manufacturers because it put an LCD in every laptop and
iPod. Mobile-phone physics was an entirely new field, however, and it
took those working on the iPhone into 2006 to realize how little they
knew. Apple built testing rooms and equipment to test the iPhone’s
antenna. Itcreated models of human heads, with viscous stuff inside to
approximate the density of human brains, to help measure the radiation
that users might be exposed to from using the phone. One senior executive
believes that more than $150 million was spent creating the first iPhone.


電腦和 iPod 上。手機硬體對Apple才是個全新的領域，而他們


手機會受到的輻射強度。一位高層判斷，為研發第一代 iPhone，

Apple花費了超過1.5 億美元。

>From the start of the project, Jobs hoped that he would be able to develop
a touch-screen iPhone running OS X similar to what he ended up unveiling.
But in 2005 he had no idea how long that would take. So Apple’s first
iPhone looked very much like the joke slide Jobs put up when introducing
the real iPhone — an iPod with an old-fashioned rotary dial on it. The
prototype really was an iPod with a phone radio that used the iPod click
wheel as a dialer. “It was an easy way to get to market, but it was not
cool like the devices we have today,” Grignon says.


iPhone 時的那樣。但在 2005 年，他也並不知道達到這步到底



第一版 iPhone 原型確實很像這樣，就是一台有通話模組的 iPod，


The second iPhone prototype in early 2006 was much closer to what Jobs
would ultimately introduce. It incorporated a touch-screen and OS X, but
it was made entirely of brushed aluminum. Jobs and Jonathan Ive, Apple’s
design chief, were exceedingly proud of it. But because neither of them
was an expert in the physics of radio waves, they didn’t realize they
created a beautiful brick. Radio waves don’t travel through metal well.
“I and Rub幯 Caballero” — Apple’s antenna expert — “had to go up
to the boardroom and explain to Steve and Ive that you cannot put radio
waves through metal,” says Phil Kearney, an engineer who left Apple in
2008. “And it was not an easy explanation. Most of the designers are
artists. The last science class they took was in eighth grade. But they
have a lot of power at Apple. So they ask, ‘Why can’t we just make a
little seam for the radio waves to escape through?’ And you have to
explain to them why you just can’t.”


樣做設備只能成為一塊漂亮的磚頭。金屬封鎖訊號的能力很強。

Phil Kearney，一位在 2008 年離職的前Apple工程師，當時得
和Apple另一位通信專家 Rub幯 Caballero 一起向賈伯斯和


Jon Rubinstein, Apple’s top hardware executive at the time, says there
were even long discussions about how big the phone would be. “I was
actually pushing to do two sizes — to have a regular iPhone and an
iPhone mini like we had with the iPod. I thought one could be a smartphone
and one could be a dumber phone. But we never got any traction on the
small one, and in order to do one of these projects, you really need to
put all your wood behind one arrow.”



The iPhone project was so complex that it occasionally threatened to
derail the entire corporation. Many top engineers in the company were
being sucked into the project, forcing slowdowns in the timetables of
other work. Had the iPhone been a dud or not gotten off the ground at
all, Apple would have had no other big products ready to announce for
a long time. And worse, according to a top executive on the project,
the company’s leading engineers, frustrated by failure, would have left
Apple.



Compounding all the technical challenges, Jobs’s obsession with secrecy
meant that even as they were exhausted by 80-hour workweeks, the few
hundred engineers and designers working on the iPhone couldn’t talk
about it to anyone else. If Apple found out you’d told a friend in a
bar, or even your spouse, you could be fired. In some cases, before a
manager could ask you to join the project, you had to sign a
nondisclosure agreement in his office. Then, after he told you what the
project was, you had to sign another document confirming that you had
indeed signed the NDA and would tell no one. “We put a sign on over the
front door of the purple dorm” — the iPhone building — “that said
‘fight club,’ because the first rule of fight club is you don’t talk
about fight club,” Scott Forstall, Apple’s senior vice president of iOS
software until last October, testified in 2012 during the Apple v. Samsung
trial. “Steve didn’t want to hire anyone from outside of Apple to work
on the user interface, but he told me I could hire anyone in the company,”
Forstall said. “So I’d bring them into my office, sit them down and tell
them: ‘You are a superstar in your current role. I have another project
that I want you to consider. I can’t tell you what it is. All I can say
is that you will have to give up nights and weekends and that you will
work harder than you have ever worked in your life.”


俱樂部。賈伯斯當時甚至不會從外部找人來做 iPhone 項目，

他給 Scott Forstall 的權利是可以從內部抽調任何人。於
是 Forstall 在找人時會把他們帶到自己辦公室，和他們說：


One of the early iPhone engineers says, “My favorite part was what all
the vendors said the day after the unveiling.” Big companies like
Marvell, which made the Wi-Fi radio chip, and CSR, which provided the
Bluetooth radio chip, hadn’t been told they were going to be in a new
phone. They thought they were going to be in a new iPod. “We actually
had fake schematics and fake industrial designs,” the engineer says.
Grignon says that Apple even went as far as to impersonate employees
of another company when they traveled, especially to Cingular. “The
whole thing was you didn’t want the receptionist or whoever happens
to be walking by to see all the badges lying out” with Apple’s name
on them.



One of the most obvious manifestations of Jobs’s obsession with secrecy
were the locked-down areas on the company’s campus — places that those
not working on the iPhone could no longer go. “Steve loved this stuff,”
Grignon says. “He loved to set up division. But it was a big ‘[expletive]
you’ to the people who couldn’t get in. Everyone knows who the rock
stars are in a company, and when you start to see them all slowly get
plucked out of your area and put in a big room behind glass doors that
you don’t have access to, it feels bad.”



Even people within the project itself couldn’t talk to one another.
Engineers designing the electronics weren’t allowed to see the software.
When they needed software to test the electronics, they were given proxy
code, not the real thing. If you were working on the software, you used
a simulator to test hardware performance.



And no one outside Jobs’s inner circle was allowed into Jonathan Ive’s
wing on the first floor of Building 2. The security surrounding Ive’s
prototypes was so tight that some employees believed the badge reader
called security if you tried to enter and weren’t authorized. “It was
weird, because it wasn’t like you could avoid going by it. It was right
off the lobby, behind a big metal door. Every now and then you’d see the
door open and you’d try to look in and see, but you never tried to do
more than that,” says an engineer whose first job out of college was
working on the iPhone. Forstall said during his testimony that some labs
required you to “badge in” four times.


畢業後第一份工作就在 iPhone 團隊的工程師如是說。Forstall

說，有些實驗室誇張到需要你先後進行四次身份驗證。

The pressure to meet Jobs’s deadlines was so intense that normal
discussions quickly devolved into shouting matches. Exhausted engineers
quit their jobs — then came back to work a few days later once they had
slept a little. Forstall’s chief of staff, Kim Vorrath, once slammed her
office door so hard it got stuck and locked her in, and co-workers took
more than an hour to get her out. “We were all standing there watching
it,” Grignon says. “Part of it was funny. But it was also one of those
moments where you step back and realize how [expletive] it all is.”


同事花了一個多小時才把她弄出來。「當時我們都站在旁邊，」

Grignon 說。「部分感受是有趣。其餘則參雜各種滋味。」

When Jobs started talking about the iPhone on Jan. 9, 2007, he said,
“This is a day I have been looking forward to for two and a half years.”
Then he regaled the audience with myriad tales about why consumers hated
their cellphones. Then he solved all their problems — definitively.



As Grignon and others from Apple sat nervously in the audience, Jobs had
the iPhone play some music and a movie clip to show off the phone’s
beautiful screen. He made a phone call to show off the phone’s reinvented
address book and voice mail. He sent a text and an e-mail, showing how
easy it was to type on the phone’s touch-screen keyboard. He scrolled
through a bunch of photos, showing how simple pinches and spreads of two
fingers could make the pictures smaller or bigger. He navigated The New
York Times’s and Amazon’s Web sites to show that the iPhone’s Internet
browser was as good as the one on his computer. He found a Starbucks with
Google Maps — and called the number from the stage — to show how it was
impossible to get lost with an iPhone.


幕。之後他打了個電話，炫耀其重新發明的通訊錄和語音郵件。



By the end, Grignon wasn’t just relieved; he was drunk. He’d brought
a flask of Scotch to calm his nerves. “And so there we were in the fifth
row or something — engineers, managers, all of us — doing shots of
Scotch after every segment of the demo. There were about five or six of
us, and after each piece of the demo, the person who was responsible for
that portion did a shot. When the finale came — and it worked along
with everything before it, we all just drained the flask. It was the best
demo any of us had ever seen. And the rest of the day turned out to be
just a [expletive] for the entire iPhone team. We just spent the entire
rest of the day drinking in the city. It was just a mess, but it was
great.”



By FRED VOGELSTEIN
Published: October 4, 2013

Fred Vogelstein is a contributing editor for Wired. His book “Dogfight:
How Apple and Google Went to War and Started a Revolution” will be
published in November.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/mag...e.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

http://www.techbang.com/posts/15078-j...f-the-death-of-jia-bosi?page=1

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