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※ 引述《ckbdfrst (ckbdfrst)》之銘言：
: 澳洲《時代》、《60分鐘》、雪黎晨鋒報，報導了 一個中國叛逃的間諜，
: 帶著大量資料，向澳洲投誠尋求政治庇護。各方消息尚待核實，但出自澳洲重量級媒體。
: 澳洲《時代》的一篇：https://reurl.cc/pD8W98
:           另外一篇：https://reurl.cc/W4zk0x
: .公布了間諜Wang Liqiang(音)的中國護照、以及偽照的韓國護照的詳細資料。
: 韓國護照是為了出入台灣活動而用。兩本護照圖片照片在第一個連結裏有。
: .王先生是隱藏在香港一上市公司裏的一個情報官員網絡的一部分，所謂中國創新投資有限
: 公司(現時長官為向心)，滲透了香港的大學、媒體。他參與了2015年綁架書商回中國的事
: 件。
: .向心的妻子喜歡(油)畫，他早期老到他家作畫，於是漸受其賞識。
: .派出學生參加學生會，假裝他們是支持香港獨立的，以認識並獲取港獨人士的個人資料。
: 他參與了綁架銅鑼灣書店老闆李波(音)到中國去的事件，他的目的是在反中的人士裏
: 「傳播恐懼與害怕」。
: .在台灣試圖用網路軍隊來改變民意，就像俄國人在美國大選所做的那樣，在台灣最主要的
: 工作是「滲透媒體」、廟宇和基層的組織，我們的工作成功了干擾了2018年九合一選舉，
: 導致親北京候選人獲勝。上級給他假韓國護照以便能來台從事影響台灣選舉的活動
: 寫得有點亂，其他自己看

由於台媒的報導都十分簡短,
讓我們看看澳洲時代原文是怎麼報導的,因為篇幅關係僅節錄與台灣有關部分
中文部分均為google翻譯.

The so-called “nine-in-one” elections in Taiwan in 2018 (during which
officials from county magistrates to local mayors were elected) presented
Beijing with an opportunity to challenge the rule of President Tsai Ing-wen.
Wang helped direct a major operation which was ultimately aimed at throwing
Tsai out of office in favour of a pro-Beijing candidate.



“Our work on Taiwan was the most important work of ours – the infiltration
into media, temples and grassroots organisations,” says Wang.

Wang說：“我們在台灣的工作是我們最重要的工作–滲透到媒體，廟宇和基層組織。”

He helped Chinese intelligence agencies build a “cyber army”, largely of
university students, to shift political debate and candidates’ fortunes.

他幫助中國情報機構組建了一支“網絡軍隊”，主要是大學生，以轉移政治辯論和候選人
的命運。

“In Taiwan we had many places - restaurants, and IT companies - which we
either acquired or funded,” Wang says. “If we wanted to attack someone, we
could instantly collapse their Facebook” from Hong Kong, using false IP
addresses to put out anti-democracy messages.

Wang說：“在台灣，我們有很多地方，包括餐館和IT公司，都是我們收購或資助的。”
來自香港的“如果我們想攻擊某人，我們可以立即摧毀他們的Facebook”，使用虛假IP地
址發布反民主消息。

Wang says CIIL also invested in Taiwanese media companies and built covert
alliances with TV stations, allowing the control and censorship of news. He
names food manufacturer and media owner the Want Want group as a key ally.

王說，CIIL還投資了台灣的媒體公司，並與電視台建立了秘密聯盟，從而可以控制和審查
新聞。 他任命食品製造商和媒體所有者旺旺集團為關鍵盟友。

“We also controlled media, like buying their ads to propagate the trend, and
let them report in favour of those candidates we were supporting,” says
Wang. Want Want’s owner Tsai Eng-meng has had “a very close relationship
and cooperation with Xiang Xin,” Wang says. A Financial Times article in
August accusing Want Want of taking editorial direction from Beijing was
dismissed by the company as “fake news”.



As well as directing positive media attention towards favoured politicians,
including presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu, Wang claims he helped finance
grassroots political support for the opposition. “With the Kuomintang [the
Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates we … gave them full support. Then we
also made donations to the temples and organised those believers to tour
mainland China and Hong Kong, and influence them with [the CCP-aligned]
United Front propaganda. As a result, we had a huge win ... and it was a
glorious record,” Wang says.







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以下這段是關於Xiang Xin, 亦取自上文中連結的澳洲時代,中文是google翻譯

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Invited to the couple’s Hong Kong house, Wang says his boss gradually took
him into his confidence. Xiang revealed his actual name was Xiang Nianxin and
that in the 1980s and early ’90s he had worked for the Chinese military
controlled Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National
Defence and Defence Industries – an organisation dedicated to building China
’s weapons program.

被邀請到這對夫婦在香港的房子時，王說他的老闆逐漸使他對他充滿了信心。Xiang透露，
他的真實姓名是Xiang Nianxin。在1980年代和90年代初，他曾在中國軍事控制的國防科
學技術工業委員會和致力於國防工業的組織工作。

Xiang also claimed to have worked for high-ranking Communist official Zou
Jiahua, a former vice-premier who in the 1980s helped develop China’s
defence industry by acquiring foreign military technology.

Xiang還聲稱曾在共產黨高級官員鄒家華任職，鄒家華曾任副總理。他在1980年代通過獲得
外國軍事技術幫助發展了中國的國防工業。

Xiang told Wang he had come to Hong Kong in 1993 to conduct intelligence
work. CIIL was created under the People’s Liberation Army General Staff
Department to “infiltrate into Hong Kong’s financial market, as well as
collecting military intelligence”, Wang says. Corporate records and
newspaper archives reveal CIIL’s close connection to Norinco, the Chinese
military’s main weapons company.



Wang says Xiang’s company was a front. Its real business was as a “core,
central agency” of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus. “It is in direct
contact with the Chinese side … playing the role of communicating between
the top level and lower levels … of military intelligence.”

王說Xiang的公司是前台。 它的真正業務是作為北京情報機構的“核心，中央機構”。
“它與中方直接接觸……扮演著高層與底層之間……軍事情報交流的角色。”

Wang was a middleman who did both intelligence and political interference
work, passing orders from bosses in Beijing to operatives in Hong Kong. He
claims he met with senior military figures on trips to China and that senior
figures from CIIL liaised with the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff
Department (since renamed and restructured) and other agencies and officials.
Wang says Xiang was in personal contact with the executive officer in Xi
Jinping’s office.




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